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Groups perpetrate the vast majority of terrorist violence (1).
Yet in recent years, counterterrorism practitioners and academics
have paid increasing attention to lone actor extremism (2,3).
Attacks such as those carried out by Anders Breivik in 2011 (77
fatalities) and Omar Mateen in 2016 (49 fatalities), as well as a
rise in lone actor violence overall, raised the specter of a new
dimension to the international terrorist threat (4,5). Without ties
to larger groups and the communication signals that entails,
preemptively detecting lone actor terrorists is perceived as a par-
ticular challenge by law enforcement and intelligence agencies
(6–10). Based in part on unique primary sources, this article pro-
vides a detailed analysis of 55 lone actors’ attack planning and
preparation in Europe and North America in the 1986–2015 per-
iod, including specific attention for temporal aspects. The results
help expand the burgeoning literature on lone actor threat assess-
ment (11–13) and offer concrete input for those working to
detect and prevent this form of terrorism.
On a definitional note, this article purposefully avoids using
the term “lone wolf” because it is sensationalist rather than
descriptive, hampering a dispassionate assessment of the phe-
nomenon (14). Moreover, as later paragraphs will illustrate, the
term’s connotations of a singular, stealthy, and deadly attacker
poorly describe the reality. For most of the individuals described
in this study, the “lone wolf” moniker is simply not applicable
and its use may perpetuate myths about these individuals’ capa-
bilities and modalities of attack planning and preparation that
can hamper effective detection and interdiction efforts. Prototypi-
cal “lone wolves” such as Anders Breivik and Unabomber Ted
Kaczynski are exceptional in terms of their social isolation and
terrorist capabilities, rather than representative of a broader
typology of terrorism.
Existing Research on Lone Actor Terrorists’ Pre-Attack
Behavior
Much has changed since Hamm wrote that lone actor terror-
ism was a “neglected field of research” (15). Data-driven studies
have provided substantive insights into the background and char-
acteristics of lone actor extremists (16–19). Some recent publica-
tions have focused specifically on lone actors’ target selection
preferences (20–23). But, “[t]here is not yet a distinct theme
within the literature on lone actor terrorism that focuses specifi-
cally on attack preparation” (21). This does not mean, however,
that previous work has not generated any insights into this
aspect of the lone actor phenomenon. Lone actor extremist vio-
lence is generally described as the result of forethought and
planning, with at least some form of preparatory conduct being
observed (1,18,24). The attacks and their preparation tend to be
relatively unsophisticated, owing to inter alia the smaller pool of
resources and relevant skills that individuals have at their dis-
posal (6,25,26). Firearms appear to be the weapon of choice,
closely followed by the use of explosives (1,24,27–31). Reflect-
ing their preference for easily obtainable and pragmatic types of
weaponry, lone actors appear increasingly drawn to vehicular
attacks, especially so in the Israeli context (30,32–34).
The relatively low sophistication of lone actor extremist
attacks is also apparent in their choice of targets. People are the
most commonly selected target, with civilians or the general
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public much more likely to be attacked than government offi-
cials or politicians, who are generally better protected
(1,18,27,31,32,35). Lone actors appear to select targets early in
the pre-attack process, shortly after grievance formation (21).
The lower rate of attack completion (36) and lethality of lone
actor attacks compared to group-based attacks (0.62 deaths per
incident vs. circa 1.60 deaths per incident, respectively) may be
another indicator of the former’s general tendency to execute
simple, straightforward operations (1). However, research has
shown that context is key. Phillips highlights that lone actors in
the United States are significantly more lethal in their attacks,
and this may be due to the easier availability of firearms (37). In
Europe, Breivik proved a very lethal terrorist who murdered 77
people. Moreover, some lone actors have shown an interest in
using nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons of
mass destruction, as well as suicide attacks (25,32,38,39).
These findings provide a general picture of lone actor attack
planning and preparation but lack depth of detail. Especially for
the purposes of detection and prevention, a finer-grained under-
standing of the various dimensions of lone actor preparatory
behavior is essential (40). Before this article attempts to fill in
some of these blanks, it is worthwhile to briefly review the liter-
ature on group-based terrorism pre-attack behavior to assess
whether it can offer insights by proxy.
Insights From the Literature on Group-Based Terrorism
There is a small but growing literature that seeks to use
knowledge of terrorist groups’ modus operandi as the basis for
“early warning indicators” that can then be incorporated in threat
assessment work (41,42). Analyzing international and domestic
terrorism in the United States between 1980 and 2004, Smith
et al. (43) found that, on average, terrorist incidents are preceded
by 2.3 activities that authorities register. Hamm’s case study
design concludes that even skilled terrorists leave clues to their
violent intentions, either through poor criminal tradecraft or a
desire to attain fame and notoriety (44). The potential to disrupt
terrorist plots through such clues is not merely a theoretical pos-
sibility: Strom et al. (45) claim that over 80 percent of foiled ter-
rorist attacks on American targets between 1999 and 2009 were
initially discovered by law enforcement or the general public.
Acquiring a more detailed understanding of lone actors’ attack
planning and preparation is thus not merely an academic exer-
cise, but one with the potential to concretely assist counterterror-
ism policy makers and practitioners. Such work is by no means
straightforward, however. Tallying the number of “precursor
acts” for 476 terrorist incidents in the United States, Smith et al.
(36) found that cells or groups engaged in three times as many
preparatory behaviors as lone actors. This underlines the impor-
tance of developing a detailed appreciation of how such attacks
are planned and prepared, to maximize the chances of detecting
and preempting them.
Assessing potential indicators of terrorist motivation or capa-
bility also requires an appreciation for contextual factors, both
large and small. Suspects’ ideological convictions are one rele-
vant element in this regard, but research has also pointed, for
instance, to the influence of socio-geography on terrorists’ tar-
geting and weapon selection preferences (46,47). More gener-
ally, terrorism seldom occurs in isolation from broader societal,
economic, and (geo) political developments (48–50). Knowledge
of the background against which a terrorist threat emerges can
be crucial for correctly assessing the intentions and threats posed
by individuals or groups of interest. A final relevant insight to
draw from the literature on group-based terrorism emphasizes
the importance of looking at capability as well as motivation.
Only when the stated intent to use violence is associated with
the means and preparations necessary to carry it out, does an
actual risk of violence emerge (51).
Analytical Approach
To acquire a detailed understanding of lone actor attack plan-
ning and preparation, a codebook was developed that recorded
both qualitative and quantitative data. This section briefly outli-
nes the analytical approach, which underpinned the development
of the codebook, before the modalities of data collection and
coding are discussed.
One of the aims of the project from which the present
research stems was to address a few of the limitations of prior
risk factor or indicator-based analyses of terrorist events. Princi-
pally, that stable indicator-based “profiles” remain elusive as
indicators appear to change between cohorts (52), that the num-
ber of indicators has continued to increase to the point of out-
stripping the number of subjects with what seems like marginal
gains in understanding (53), and that the rationale behind select-
ing certain indicators over others has often been left to the
reader to figure out (54). To tackle some of these issues, a risk
analysis framework was developed, which drew from crimino-
logical research to identify the key categories of causal mecha-
nisms and processes which characterize each phase of the lone
actor extremist event and try to dispel some of the conceptual
fuzziness surrounding key constructs (e.g., motivation).
An in-depth discussion of the framework and its development
is beyond the scope of this study but is available elsewhere (55).
With regard to attack preparation and planning, two related pro-
cesses were identified as key to this phase of the event, meaning
that disrupting either of these processes would disrupt the event
altogether: the emergence (and maintenance) of the motivation
to act and the perception of the capability to act (successfully).
Indicators that made up the codebook were inferred to be visible
“flags,” symptoms or markers of these key processes likely to be
detectable by stakeholders, but with the understanding that in
another time or place the specific markers (e.g., weapon type)
may appear different, though their function (e.g., capability
acquisition) remained.
The presence of both indicators of intent and capability was
seen as a key way for overcoming the problem of false positives.
While relatively many people might issue threats, especially
online, and thus appear to have the motivation to commit an
attack, an actual threat does not occur unless that motivation is
matched to at least a rudimentary level of capability. Our analyt-
ical approach does not claim to be able to remove the false-posi-
tive problem when conducting threat assessment work, yet by
matching a theoretically nuanced understanding of motivation
and capability with a fine-grained empirical analysis, we aim to
provide counterterrorism practitioners and others working in the
realm of threat assessment with concrete guidance in this endea-
vor.
Motivation is understood here as an individual’s goal-directed
attention toward planning, preparing, and ultimately committing
an act of terrorist violence. The motivation to harm or kill others
and/or cause damage to property is commonly seen as the result
of a complex process in which a variety of factors play a role
(56,57). Within the aforementioned risk analysis framework, the
emergence of motivation is understood as a situational process; in
other words, motivation is not a stable individual characteristic,
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but rather the outcome of the interaction between the person and
the frictions present in his or her environment (58). The origin
of these frictions can be more or less proximal, ranging from
events such as the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan
but also leader-follower interactions or personal historical events
(59).
Moreover, the relative role of frictions may change over time.
The factors that sparked an interest in violence are not necessar-
ily the same ones that sustain the motivation to act through to
the end of the event (60,61). It is precisely because motivation is
a situational process that it is so sensitive to time and place and,
once emerged, needs to be sustained, which brings us to the sec-
ond, key process associated with attack preparation and plan-
ning. For motivation to be sustained beyond the initial
perception of a temptation or provocation, a person has to per-
ceive that they have the capability to carry out the action suc-
cessfully. Without some sense that something is doable, most
people will not be able to sustain the drive to action.
In the context of terrorist action, the acquisition of weapons
and explosives is central to the development of capability, but
this aspect of planning and preparatory behavior also has a cog-
nitive dimension. For example, lone actor extremists need a
basic level of technical proficiency and experience if weapons
are to be used with some measure of effectiveness. Substantial
numbers of (would-be) terrorists actually lack such skills (62).
Hence, attempts to gain relevant knowledge and experience, for
instance, through attending firearms courses or traveling abroad
to participate in paramilitary training, could be important observ-
able indicators of capability acquisition and (by extension) moti-
vation maintenance and thus potential intervention points.
Interrupt one or the other, and the event is disrupted.
Furthermore, the acquisition of capability also means over-
coming innate moral barriers to harming and killing others,
which may be accomplished through the internalization of
extremist ideology or the viewing of materials that produce a
desensitization to extreme violence (63). Research suggests that
this state may be harder for lone actors to achieve than for
extremists operating in groups, thus justifying an analytical view
of capability acquisition that extends beyond a focus on weap-
onry and other material aspect of offense commission (17,64).
Hence, analytical attention to the acquisition and maintenance
of the material and cognitive capability to carry out acts of vio-
lence also focuses attention on the role of social ties and external
assistance. Although the term “lone actor” implies a high or
even complete degree of autonomy, these individuals are in actu-
ality seldom completely isolated (65). Contacts with other peo-
ple, whether in “real life” or the online domain, can be crucial
to the emergence and maintenance of both motivation and capa-
bility (66). Lone actors frequently seek some form of legitimiza-
tion for the use violence from people they see as authority
figures and might approach others to gain their (sometimes
unwitting) help with the acquisition of the means or skills neces-
sary to carry out an attack (18).
As stated, motivation and capability are understood as concep-
tually connected, whereby motivation may drive actions geared
toward acquiring capability, while, reflexively, the actor’s per-
ception of their own capability to realize their intent successfully
may impact whether their motivation is sustained over time.
Because emergence of motivation and acquisition of capability
are both temporal processes, indicators related to time especially
were given pride of place in the study’s codebook. Arguably,
acts of political violence are rarely completely spontaneous.
Most occur at the end of some lengthy process, even if the
length of time elapsed between the earliest desire to commit an
attack and its actual execution varies widely (36,43,67). This
means that the study of lone actor attack planning and prepara-
tion should, where possible, also capture when behaviors
occurred and what the duration of the various activities was.
Methodology
Coding Lone Actor Attack Planning and Preparation
Data on each of the 55 cases were first entered into a spe-
cially made Excel sheet to visualize the chronological progres-
sion of the various aspects of lone actors’ pre-attack behavior
and to provide qualitative information on this process. Second,
this information was analyzed using a codebook based on the
one that Gill et al. (18) used in their study of 119 lone actor ter-
rorists. The codebook was tailored and expanded to focus specif-
ically on attack planning and preparation in as much detail as
possible, using insights from the broader literature on (lone
actor) terrorist attack planning and the authors’ previous work
on this topic to do so.
The final version of the codebook contained 198 variables, all
of which were linked to either the emergence and maintenance
of motivation or the acquisition of the capability to commit an
act of terrorist violence, as well as the temporal indicators asso-
ciated with these processes. Its development followed an itera-
tive process, whereby the qualitative information captured in the
Excel sheet could lead to the inclusion of new variables as
aspects of lone actors’ pre-attack behavior materialized that were
not expected a-priori. Naturally, any new or amended variables
were applied retrospectively to all cases in the dataset. This
approach ensured that the authors were not limited in their anal-
ysis to pre-existing notions about lone actor attack planning and
preparation.
A straightforward coding scheme was used, consisting of
“yes,” “no,” “unknown” or “does not apply.” For those vari-
ables that captured temporal information, time was measured in
months. For instance, when a certain event occurred 2 days
prior to arrest, this was noted as “2/[total days in that month].”
The first author was responsible for the coding task. Four
research assistants provided help by gathering (additional)
information on nine of the 55 cases, which the first author then
incorporated into the codebook. No formal inter-rater reliability
test was conducted, as the coding itself remained the first
author’s responsibility, who manually checked the data pro-
vided against the sources listed to assess its accuracy and
whether it was coded in line with his own assessment of the
case.
It should be noted that the availability and the accuracy of the
information, particularly with regard to temporal aspects, was
often less than ideal. In the best cases, the sources provided data
that were precise down to the day. More frequently, sources
would mention that a particular activity occurred “approximately
a month before the attack,” or that it took place “between 6 and
12 months” prior to the event. As a rule, whenever a period of
time was provided, the earliest likely date was used. Whenever
the available data conflicted, two steps were taken. First, the
majority opinion was ascertained: which interpretation was pub-
lished most frequently? Second, the quality and impartiality of
the sources were scrutinized to judge their relative value. For
instance, findings based on long-term investigative reporting
were judged more reliable than short newspaper excerpts printed
anonymously.
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Case Selection and Data Collection
As it represents the most complete and detailed dataset of lone
actor terrorists currently available, the 119 cases included in the
2014 study by Gill et al. formed the foundation of this study.
Because of the particularly detailed nature of the codebook used
for the examination of lone actor attack planning and preparation
and the attempt to gain primary sources based information on at
least a part of the sample, it was not possible to assess all 119
cases within the time available. Instead, the cases in the Gill
et al. dataset were ranked according to how rich information was
on the planning and preparatory phase of the event, which
yielded an initial list of 43 individuals for which sufficient infor-
mation was thought to be available. Two Canadian, one Ameri-
can, one Danish and eight Dutch cases were later added as they
also appeared to offer the requisite level of detail on pre-attack
behavior. In total, therefore, this article presents findings based
on 55 cases of lone actor extremists (see Table S1).
The relative scarcity of lone actor extremist attacks and the
difficulties associated with gaining access to privileged informa-
tion, such as police files, make open-source information espe-
cially valuable. Yet, the accuracy and level of detail found in
media-based publications can be a matter of concern (68–70).
The authors would have preferred to utilize primary sources for
the entire sample. Police files in particular can offer a level of
detail and reliability usually not found in the public record.
Unfortunately, requests for access to such sources proved unfea-
sible for legal reasons except in regard to five of the eight cases
drawn from the Netherlands. In addition to the Dutch police
files, the first author also conducted semi-structured interviews
with Dutch police investigators and public prosecutors who
worked on those five cases. To address the lack of similar access
for the other 50 cases, the authors utilized biographies, autobio-
graphical materials, and sentencing documents for all the other
cases wherever possible (71–74).
The results presented in this article cover a cross-section of
the lone actor threat as it occurred in Europe and North America
over the 1978–2015 period, encompassing individuals driven by
ideological convictions labeled as Islamist (38%), right-wing
extremist (29%), anti-abortion (15%), antigovernment (5%), sin-
gle-issue (4%), animal rights activism (2%), and “unclear”(7%).
Of these individuals, 74% carried out an attack, which in 13%
of the cases failed during its execution for a variety of reasons.
The remainder were arrested while in advanced stages of attack
planning and preparation. As most of the 55 cases predate 2011,
the sample has little to say directly about the recent lone actor
threat emanating from returning “foreign fighters,” those citizens
of Western countries who left to join Islamist terrorist groups in
Syria and Iraq (75). This is one area where future research could
make a substantial contribution to extant insights.
The designation lone actor extremist remains a subjective one.
There is an ongoing debate on what constitutes a lone actor ter-
rorist (26,76,77). A distinction can be made in the literature
between definitions that focus on individual terrorists operating
completely autonomously of extremist groups or networks (24),
those that operate autonomously but do or did participate in such
groups (18), and isolated dyads or even triads of individuals that
operate jointly but lack ties to a larger extremist organization or
movement (78,79). This article selected cases predominantly
from the first of these categories and included cases from the
second only when the attack itself appeared to be planned, pre-
pared, and perpetrated by one particular individual. Dyads and
triads were ruled out, because as soon as two or three people
conspire to commit acts of terrorist violence, group dynamics
come into effect that by definition rule out the lone actor label
(65,80).
Some readers may look at the finding that most of the sample
turned out to have social ties to other radicals, extremist, or ter-
rorists and question why these individuals were included for
analysis in the first place. It is therefore important to emphasize
that this study builds upon a dataset of individuals commonly
seen as lone actors and that the results which problematize this
designation followed from the subsequent analysis. While case
selection is likely to remain a topic of debate, the authors assert
that the findings discussed below offer insights into lone actor
attack planning and preparation that significantly add to the aca-
demic debate on this topic while simultaneously providing
actionable information for counterterrorism practitioners.
Results and Discussion
The following discussion is organized into eight sections cor-
responding to broad categories of relevant factors. These are (i)
lone actors’ personal background, (ii) the social context in which
they operated, (iii) attack planning and (iv) attack preparation,
(v) operational security, (vi) so-called “leakage behavior,” (vii)
postpreparation activities, and (viii) any relevant-related activi-
ties. Rather than discussing all of the codebook’s variables, the
discussion is limited to those the authors deem to be most rele-
vant. Finally, a Gantt chart is presented that visualizes the tem-
poral aspects of lone actor attack planning and preparation. To
provide an indication of the data quality per variable, the per-
centage of cases for which no information could be found is pro-
vided as the percentage “unknown.” For an at-a-glance overview
of the findings, see Table S2.
Personal Background
There is considerable consensus among academics that terror-
ism is not chiefly the outcome of mental health issues, personal-
ity profiles, or specific character traits, which is not to say such
elements cannot play a role in bringing about involvement in
this form of violence (81,82). Congruent with a focus on motiva-
tion emergence and capability, data collection on lone actors’
personal backgrounds paid particular attention to prior involve-
ment in crime and militancy. Most interestingly, 46% of our
sample had a history of violent behavior, including domestic
abuse and stabbing attacks (13% unknown). This is consistent
with prior research suggesting that aggressiveness is often asso-
ciated with increased likelihood of involvement in criminal vio-
lence (83) and recalls Della Porta’s finding that prior experience
of using violence for political means was a consistent back-
ground factor among the Italian terrorists of the 1970s and
1980s (84). Within a broader lone actor threat assessment frame-
work, a history of violence is likely to be a reliable indicator of
potential to carry out an attack, given that, across problem
domains, one of the most reliable predictors of future violence is
past violent behavior (41,85).
Social Context
Lone actor extremists are frequently seen as individuals who
live an isolated existence and plan, prepare, and execute their
acts of violence by themselves. The presumed isolation of lone
actors in particular is thought to be one of the reasons why they
pose a special challenge to police and intelligence agencies
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(7,86). It is therefore notable that 62% of our sample turned out
to have contacts with clearly radical, extremist, or terrorist
(87,88) individuals (9% unknown). Moreover, 33% socialized
with individuals who could be designated as leaders or authority
figures within radical, extremist, or terrorist groups (16%
unknown). Finally, 31% were recognized members or partici-
pants in radical, extremist, or terrorist groups at some point in
their lives (4% unknown). Although their peers oftentimes
described these individuals as on the fringes of these group, even
marginal or passive participation in radical, extremist, or terrorist
groups can have significant influences on the adoption and main-
tenance of the motive to commit acts of extremist violence.
As social learning theory, research on social identity, and
research on the situational nature of criminal motivation shows
(89,90), to hear others state that the use of violence is both
effective and acceptable can be a powerful way of overcoming
the societal stigma associated with such behavior and natural
instinct not to perform such activities. The effect is increased
when “role models” are present who through their own (past)
use of violence can demonstrate that violence is a course of
action worthy of emulation for reasons of efficacy or status.
Indeed, identification with such violent role models, the warrior
mentality to which they appeal and the weapons, paraphernalia,
and clothing that are a part of it, has been highlighted as an
important potential warning sign for impending violence (64).
Participation in groups that condone or even actively support the
use of force can thus contribute to overcoming moral barriers to
the use of violence (91).
That the broader “radical milieu” matters, is given further
emphasis by the finding that 78% of our sample were exposed
to external sources of encouragement or justification for the use
of violence (9% unknown) (92). These took the shape of ideo-
logical materials found both on and offline, as well as violent
“role models” such as leading jihadist militants or infamous mur-
derers of abortion providers accessed through those same media.
Although such materials do not require any direct interaction to
be found and consumed, these findings do underline that lone
actors draw inspiration and emulation from the wider radical
environment of which they were a part. In short, our findings
suggest that social settings supportive of radicalism, extremism,
or terrorism play an important role part in the commission of
extremist events, even for those thought of as “lone” actors.
Our sample was primarily alone in the sense that, in the vast
majority of cases, the ultimate decision to carry-through with an
act of terrorist violence was theirs alone. In only two cases was
there outside pressure or guidance to carry out an attack (93). A
minority of lone actors were, however, found to have been the
recipient of assistance during planning (16%) and preparation
(29%) stages (11% and 7% unknown, respectively). Such out-
side help ranged from assistance with selecting targets or the
provision of a postattack hideout, to guidance on creating explo-
sives and other weapons. In short, while the majority of our lone
actor extremists carried out their violent act alone, social ties
played an important role in the emergence of motivation to com-
mit violence and, in some cases, during the planning and prepa-
ration of these attacks.
Attack Planning
Activities in this category are focused on target selection and
the elaboration of plans of attack, rather than on more practical
necessities such as constructing explosives, which we have
labeled attack preparation. A successful planning phase leaves
(would-be) terrorists with a clear (albeit often implicit, rather
than formally recorded) road map of the actions that need to be
undertaken to carry out their attack (42).
For 71% of the lone actors studied, the (intended) attack was
the result of at least a rudimentary planning process (11%
unknown). Only 11% of these individuals decided to engage in
violence spontaneously (for instance, upon spotting a suitable
target of opportunity). When planning an attack, 36% of lone
actors considered multiple targets (33% unknown). In a majority
of cases, the planned and actual targets overlapped, providing
another indication that lone actor extremist violence is generally
premeditated rather than spontaneous. Owing the relatively “old”
nature of the sample, the use of the Internet to acquire informa-
tion on potential targets could only be confirmed in 11% of the
cases (44% unknown). However, “real-life” target reconnais-
sance was conducted by 38% of the individuals in the sample
(29% unknown).
We found that 60% of the individuals studied were influenced
by one or more constraints during the target selection process
(33% unknown). The majority of lone actor extremists weighed
the pros and cons of the targets available to them. Constraints
included target accessibility and degree of protection, but in
some cases also encompassed distinctly personal factors, such as
the likeliness that friends or family would be caught up in the
attack. Research has indicated that the incidence of mental health
problems is considerably higher among lone actor extremists
than the general public and particularly pronounced when com-
pared to group-based terrorists (16,94,95). Our findings support
existing research which cautions that such findings should not
be seen as providing a causal explanation for involvement in ter-
rorism, as they suggest that such pathologies do not rule out the
ability to engage in at least basic planning and cost-benefit anal-
ysis (1,18).
The decision to initiate attack planning was preceded by a
clearly identifiable “trigger event” in 44% of the cases (22%
unknown). This finding echoes research on the role of “cognitive
openings,” such as personal setbacks or seeing others success-
fully use violence, in bringing about involvement in radical or
extremist groups (96). It suggests that the intention to commit
violence or the belief that violence is justified is unlikely to be
enough on their own to initiate the attack process. This is consis-
tent with the view, long held in criminology, that propensity (be-
lief in the legitimacy of violence; i.e., radicalization) and
motivation to commit an act of violence are distinct concepts in
the analysis of violence and that this distinction is a crucial one,
inasmuch as preventing propensity acquisition and disrupting
motivation emergence and maintenance require very different
kinds of interventions (97).
Attack Preparation
Attack preparation relates to all those activities that must be
undertaken to make an act of terrorist violence possible in a
practical sense. This primarily concerns the acquisition or, as
was often the case with regard to explosives, the construction of
weapons. Preparation can also entail gathering the necessary
funds or soliciting outside support, for instance, to acquire the
necessary bomb-making skills.
Firearms were the weapon most frequently chosen by the lone
actor extremists studied (62%), followed by attempts to construct
explosive devices (44%; 2% and 4% unknown, respectively).
Interestingly, attempts to make or acquire firearms and explo-
sives were less frequently accompanied by activities aimed at
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learning to utilize such weapons effectively. At 15% (7%
unknown), relatively few lone actors had a background of (para)
military training; only 35% of the individuals studied took fire-
arms training and only 33% practiced shooting by themselves.
These findings must be qualified by the fact that data on fire-
arms training and shooting practice were unavailable in 29% and
33% of the cases, respectively. Still, this suggests that limited
weapons-related expertise may account for the relatively lower
lethality of lone actor attacks compared to group-based acts of
violence. These findings support the notion of lone actors as, on
the whole preferring, or being forced to adopt through their lim-
ited resources or know-how, relatively unsophisticated modes of
attack (25).
Several aspects of the preparatory process are interesting pre-
cisely because they occurred infrequently. In only 13% of the
cases studied did the individuals take steps to secure finances
additional to existing sources of income (29% unknown). This
once again underlines the relatively unsophisticated and conse-
quently inexpensive nature of most lone actor extremist attacks.
The data also show the unpopularity of incendiary devices, such
as Molotov cocktails, which were present in only 13% of cases
(2% unknown). While simple to construct, their relatively limited
ability to (directly) inflict deadly physical harm may diminish
their appeal. Most notably, only 11% of lone actors acquired a
remote location specifically to conduct their preparatory activi-
ties (6% unknown). Lone actors’ predisposition toward conduct-
ing preparatory activities at or close to their place of residence
forms another potential point of detection and intervention, as
bomb-making activities in particular have the potential to be
noticed by other citizens (98).
We also considered whether weapons were acquired specifi-
cally for the (intended) attack. While 71% of explosives were
created with violent intent in mind (4% unknown), only 47% of
firearms were procured specifically for the purpose of an attack
(13% unknown). Some individuals were simply fascinated by
such weapons (99), used them for hunting or recreational shoot-
ing, while others had employed them for criminal acts unrelated
to terrorism. While the acquisition of explosives is likely to be a
sign of an impending attack, the procurement of firearms and
other weapons may not be necessarily similarly revealing. This
is particularly the case in countries where acquiring such weap-
ons can be easily and legally achieved.
Operational Security and Leakage Behavior
Operational security includes behaviors that lone actors delib-
erately engage in to minimize their chances of detection while
planning or preparing an attack. Leakage behavior, as defined by
Meloy and O’Toole, refers to the behavior of (would-be) lone
actors who intentionally or unintentionally divulge their motiva-
tion or capability to commit acts of violence, thus providing
opportunities for early detection and intervention (100).
By far, the most surprising finding was the infrequency with
which lone actors took operational security precautions. Only
26% took measures to maintain plot secrecy (18% unknown).
The lack of often straightforward operational security proce-
dures is surprising, given the degree of amateurism betrayed by
such lapses. For instance, only 6% of the lone actors imple-
mented data protection measures (7% unknown), leaving
incriminating evidence such as bomb-making manuals in plain
sight for the authorities. Likewise, only 24% of the individuals
studied tried to hide weapons, explosives, or the precursor com-
ponents necessary for the latter’s construction (0% unknown).
Most lone actors simply stored such materials in their place of
residence.
It may be argued that the disregard for operational security
stems from an intent to die during the attack itself. Such a desire
for “martyrdom” would obviate the need to prevent the discov-
ery of evidence during postattack investigation. Operational
security measures, however, are just as important, if not more
so, to prevent discovery by the authorities or general public dur-
ing preparatory conduct. Utter disregard for the personal conse-
quences of carrying out an act of terrorism means little if the
attack is pre-empted. From the perspective of lone actor terror-
ists, operational security is thus crucial regardless of whether the
aim was to survive the attack or perish during its execution.
With regard to leakage behavior, a striking 86% of lone actors
communicated their radical or extremist convictions to others, be
that family members, friends, colleagues, or strangers online (7%
unknown). Of course, a much larger number of people will make
such threats than those who actually follow through on them.
From a threat assessment perspective, it is perhaps more interest-
ing that 58% of the sample gave others the idea that they were
involved in suspicious and potentially violent activities (7%
unknown). A third of lone actors communicated a desire to com-
mit an (as of yet) unspecified attack, for instance, by stating
online that they “wanted to kill someone” (11% unknown).
Moreover, 26% went so far as to divulge specific intentions, for
example, that they were planning to kill a particular individual
(7% unknown). A specific desire to cause harm was expressed
offline in the majority of cases (71% vs. 29%), whereas unspeci-
fic desires to cause harm were shared online as much as offline
(50%).
Almost half of all lone actors (49%) came in contact with the
authorities during the planning and preparation phase (7%
unknown). This does not mean that the police or intelligence
agencies were necessarily aware of their extremist convictions or
terrorist intent, however. Frequently, the individuals in our sam-
ple had a criminal record for transgressions unrelated to ideolog-
ically driven violence. More telling in terms of leakage behavior,
27% of lone actors were suspected of involvement in terrorism,
while they were engaged in planning and preparatory activities
(11% unknown). In other words, just under one-third of lone
actors studied were already on the authorities’ radar as potential
terrorist threats.
Lone actors’ generally poor operational security and their fre-
quent tendency to engage in leakage behavior are both promising
findings for detection and prevention purposes. Most of these
individuals are not highly lethal and stealthy operatives. Inexpe-
rience, carelessness, and a desire for infamy render many vulner-
able to drawing the attention of the authorities or other citizens.
The obverse, however, is that those who do invest in operational
security and avoid leakage behavior, such as Anders Breivik and
Ted Kaczynski, are among the most dangerous lone actor terror-
ists. Thus, while the majority of lone actors present an essen-
tially detectable and preventable threat, the most dangerous of
them may be the hardest to find.
PostPreparation Phase
Research on the preparatory behavior of group-based terrorists
has indicated that the completion of this phase might be marked
by a sudden drop in activity (43). A postpreparation phase char-
acterized by an absence of activity could function as a crucial
final warning indicator, signaling that an attack is imminent and
requiring immediate intervention by security forces. In 47% of
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the cases, there was nothing to suggest that the finalization of
attack planning and preparation led to a period of relative calm
followed by the attack itself. For the remaining individuals, there
was either no relevant data available or the question did not
apply because they were apprehended before they could finish
attack planning and preparation. The relatively poor data quality
for this variable means that no definitive conclusion can be
reached on whether a distinct “post-preparation phase” can form
a part of lone actors’ pre-attack behavior.
Related Activities
The last category in the codebook was designed to address a
qualitative question: did the individual in question engage in any
“related activities” that could strengthen suspicion regarding their
motivation or capability to plan and prepare an attack? Such
related activities are themselves not illegal or directly linked to
preparation for violence but might provide a glimpse of an indi-
vidual’s worldview or an inkling of his or her social networks
that can then function as a valuable piece in the threat assess-
ment puzzle. Related activities were found in 53% of cases and
fell into two broad categories (9% unknown). The most fre-
quently noted related activity was involvement in right-wing
extremist groups or movements, followed by involvement in (the
radical fringe of) the anti-abortion movement in the United
States. Interestingly, jihadist lone actors appear less likely to be
or have been involved in groups that share their ideological
beliefs.
Temporal Aspects of Attack Planning and Preparation
The Gantt chart in Fig. 1 shows the average duration of the
various activities associated with the lone actor attack planning
and preparation process for which more than one data point was
available. With time given in months, it provides an overview of
when activities began and how long they lasted, relative to the
(intended) act of violence or the perpetrators’ arrest, marked as
“0 hour” in the chart. Because data on the duration of attack
planning and preparation activities were not always available
and frequently of undetermined accuracy, the chart should be
treated as suggestive. Nevertheless, it provides insights into the
temporal dimension of lone actors’ pre-attack behavior that can
hopefully be of both academic and practical relevance.
Most striking is that, on the whole, the various aspects related
to attack planning and preparation begin months and even years
before the actual attack or the suspect’s apprehension. This once
again suggests that lone actor extremists are on the whole not
prone to strike on a whim but do so following a lengthy period
in which their activities and leakage behavior renders them vul-
nerable to being found out and pre-empted. Of course, there can
be stark differences between individual cases. But looking at
Fig. 1 as representing the “average” build-up to a lone actor
extremist event, several other points deserve to be raised.
With regard to the sequence of events, it appears that involve-
ment in nonradical and subsequently radical milieus tends to
occur first. Leakage behavior then follows suit, beginning with
the espousal of convictions before moving on to intent. It is only
after leakage has begun that most forms of preparatory conduct
can be found. It seems that many lone actors develop a desire to
do something and begin amassing the necessary means before
that “something” is given particular thought. Alternatively, lone
actor extremists may match intention to capability rather than
the other way around. In other words, perception of capability
may prove even more central to the emergence of motivation
than our analytical framework already accounts for. Firearms
and (para) military training appear as outliers because these find-
ings are strongly associated with those few lone actors who have
a military background.
While planning-related activities such as target selection take
place closest to the attack itself, and frequently after attack
preparation has begun, the development of the intent to use such
violence occurs significantly earlier. This makes sense, as the
emergence and maintenance of intent are crucial to the ability to
prepare, and particularly to carry-through with, an actual attack.
In those cases where pre-attack behavior is shielded through
operational security measures, these tend to begin alongside
FIG. 1––Duration of attack planning and preparation activities (from intended or executed attack; in months).
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preparatory activities. Again, this is logical, as the acquisition of
violent means is the most revealing (and frequently illegal) step
toward realizing a terrorist attack.
With the exception of threats issued to potential targets, which
occurs on average some 5.2 months before the (intended) attack,
leakage behaviors were found to occur years in advance of the
planned act of violence and, in many cases, of the observance of
operational security measures. Not only do lone actor extremists
communicate their convictions and intentions for violence to
others, but they start doing so on average years before they will
strike. In other words, the detection and prevention of this form
of terrorism do not necessarily depend on last-minute detection
of motivation and capability, but can in theory take place at
points in time when the individuals in question may still be dis-
suaded from pursuing violent plans in the first place.
Several activities are best seen as moments in time, rather than
processes that occur over days, weeks, or months. These
moments are indicated as small bars in the chart. The relative
proximity of some of these moments to the execution of the (in-
tended) attack makes them potentially potent signs that the indi-
vidual in question is coming to the end of his or her planning
and preparation activities and may therefore be almost in a posi-
tion to strike. Particularly relevant from this perspective of prox-
imity are receiving an order to carry out an act of violence
(which was found to have occurred in only one case), compos-
ing a will or martyrdom video, (attempting to) purchase a ready-
made explosive device, hiding evidence, and issuing threats to
intended targets.
Conclusion
Most terrorist violence continues to be perpetrated by groups,
yet the incidence of lone actor attacks is increasing, a develop-
ment highlighted by a spate of lone actor terrorist violence in
Europe and the United States during 2016 and 2017. Against
this backdrop, and in light of the prevalent notion that lone actor
extremists pose a threat that is particularly difficult to detect and
pre-empt because of their lack of operational ties to co-conspira-
tors, the present article utilized detailed empirical data to provide
unique insights into these individuals’ pre-attack behavior,
including their temporal dimensions. The findings presented here
offer law enforcement and security service personnel, as well as
operationally oriented behavioral scientists and other consultants,
actionable insights that can be used to perform or improve threat
assessment procedures.
All policy is built upon assumptions. Should we persist in
viewing the lone actor threat as a phenomenon characterized by
socially isolated individuals who do not engage in any form of
communication, we risk impeding our ability to effectively
detect and address this danger. It is precisely the significant
degree of social interaction between lone actors and broader rad-
ical milieus which re-opens avenues for detection and interdic-
tion that may have been thought closed or unlikely to deliver.
Four findings in particular underline the relevance of this study
for the detection and prevention of lone actor terrorist violence.
• Lone actors tend to be poor at, or unconcerned with, opera-
tional security;
• They engage in leakage behavior that allows others to
glimpse their convictions and violent intentions;
• The majority of lone actors do indeed maintain social ties
that are crucial to the development of their motivation and
capability to commit acts of terrorist violence;
• Temporal analysis indicates that most of the elements that are
crucial to the planning and preparation of a lone actor terror-
ist attack begin months, if not years, beforehand, which sug-
gests that law enforcement and security agencies need not
necessarily rely on last-minute indicators of an impending
strike but, given sufficient data and a correct analysis of con-
textual specifics, can engage in the early detection, interrup-
tion, and prevention of lone actor violence.
Furthermore, our findings join those of several other
authors in challenging key aspects of the lone actor extremist
phenomenon as portrayed in some of the academic and popu-
lar literature (101–103). Notably, the prevalence and role of
social ties in the emergence and maintenance of theses indi-
viduals’ motivation to act violently altogether problematize
the ontological necessity of a discrete “lone actor” analytical
category. It seems to us that the lone actor type has been
built from exceptions, rather than from the majority of lone
actor cases. Norwegian mass-murderer Anders Breivik, for
instance, was a highly intelligent, patient, and lethal terrorist,
well-aware of the need to maintain operational security and
avoid any potential leakage behavior. Yet in these respects
he did not represent lone actors in general, but distinguished
himself from the ways in which this form of violence usu-
ally manifests itself.
Looking to possibilities for future research, we begin by reit-
erating our analytical stance. As well as sequencing indicators,
we would argue that advancing the state-of-the-art, both scien-
tific and practical, in this field requires explicitly tying indicators
to meaningful causal mechanisms and processes. Given their
inherent instability (markers can be expected to vary across ideo-
logical, geographical, and temporal contexts), indicator- (or risk
factor) based risk assessment faces limitations that robust analyt-
ical models could help address. In addition, it would be worth-
while for future research on lone actor attack planning and
preparation to attempt to overcome some of the limitations found
in the present study, namely emphasis on pre-2011 cases and the
strong empirical reliance on media reporting and other secondary
sources.
Terrorist attacks executed by single attackers using relatively
unsophisticated means to deadly effect are likely to remain a
recurrent feature of the security landscape in Western states for
the foreseeable future. Hopefully, this article and the approach to
studying this phenomenon that it embodies will serve to inform
discussion not only on the ways through which this form of vio-
lence can be prevented, disrupted, and mitigated, but also, more
fundamentally, with regard to its defining features. Much work
still needs to be done before the processes that lead to lone actor
violence can be fully understood, but the results presented here
can serve as a stepping stone in this process.
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